India's Golden Quadrilateral Program aimed at improving the quality and width of existing highways connecting the four largest cities in India. This affected the quality of highways available to …rms in cities that lie along the routes of the four upgraded highways, while leaving the quality of highways available to …rms in other cities una¤ected. This feature allows for a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation strategy, implemented using data from the 2002 and 2005 rounds of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys for India. Firms in cities a¤ected by the Golden Quadrilateral highway project reported decreased transportation obstacles to production, reduced average stock of input inventories (by about a week's worth of production), and a higher probability of having switched the supplier who provided them with their primary input. Firms in cities where road quality did not improve displayed no signi…cant changes.
Introduction and Motivation
This paper studies the response of …rms in India to an ambitious program of highway improvements in order to measure the economic e¤ects of infrastructure investments, an issue that has received widespread attention both in the context of developing countries such as India and more generally. It is motivated by, and contributes to, two strands in the literature.
The …rst is the literature on the role of the private sector in economic development, and particularly e¤ects of government policies in enabling, constraining or retarding how the private sector performs (for example, Djankov et al. 2008 , Knittel 2002 . Within this literature, the Indian case has been the subject of a growing literature. Recent contributions to this literature have argued, for example, that excessively restrictive licensing policies were responsible for sub-optimal …rm performance (see Chari 2007) . This paper emphasizes the government's role as an enabler for private-sector development, since it …nds positive e¢ ciency e¤ects of large-scale investments in infrastructure. In the speci…c case of India, this is a particularly compelling story, since many commentators have argued that the ‡ipside of the Indian government's historical over-involvement with regulating and controlling private-sector activity was a tendency to neglect precisely those areas, such as infrastructure provision, where it may have had the greatest scope for impact.
More generally, this paper examines the economic e¤ects of investments in infrastructure, in the spirit of papers such as Chandra and Thompson (2000) . Highways are the quintessential example of such investments, are often posited as being essential for higher economic growth. Signi…cant budgetary resources are allocated to highway construction in many countries based in part on a hypothesized causal link between infrastructure development and economic growth. Yet, empirical evidence on this issue is 'extremely controversial, and consists of studies that are divided on both the magnitude and direction of the net e¤ect of infrastructure spending on economic growth' (Chandra and Thompson 2000) .
Several issues complicate the estimation of the economic e¤ects of infrastructure. First, while a variety of studies have found positive correlations between the level of infrastructure in an area and economic outcomes of interest, such as growth, endogeneous placement of new infrastructure makes it di¢ cult to clearly quantify the causal e¤ects on economic outcomes of interest. This issue can be summed up as follows: do areas with (more, better) infrastructure show better economic outcomes because of the infrastructure, or do better economic outcomes, or the potential for better economic outcomes, attract better infrastructure? Thus, we may see that better roads are linked to faster growth, but if we suspect that roads are likely to have been built or improved in areas that had the highest potential for economic growth, our estimates of the impact of roads on growth are biased upwards. Secondly, infrastructure can a¤ect not only the quantum, but also the spatial distribution of economic activity, so that accounting for spillovers is important if we try to capture the overall net impact of infrastructure. Thirdly, there is little empirical evidence, apart from a small number of case studies (see, for example, Gulyani 2001), on the channels through which infrastructure a¤ects economic outcomes. While studies of e¤ects on growth or employment exist, there is little information on …rm-level variables (such as inventories, input costs, capacity utilization, competition) that may respond to improvements in transport infrastructure, and through which the bene…cial economic e¤ects of highway construction are channeled.
While truly random placement of a major infrastructure project is hard to conceive of, a series of recent papers cognizant of the endogeneity issue have attempted to deal with it in di¤erent ways. For example, Du ‡o and Pande (2004) use gradient to instrument for the placement of hydroelectric projects in India, so as to obtain plausibly causal estimates of the economic e¤ects of large hydroelectric projects. In the case of highway construction, both Chandra and Thompson (2000) and Michaels (2007) use a feature of the US Interstate Highway construction program that allows them to treat it as a natural experiment for counties through which the new interstate highways (did not) pass. The idea derives from the nature of the highway-building exercise: when a highway is built to connect cities A and B, it must pass through areas that lie in between the two, thus contributing to improved infrastructure in places that happen to lie in between the (possibly endogenously chosen) points that the highway is built to connect. If there is reason to believe that the precise route of the highway was not manipulated to include some intermediate areas (counties, districts, cities) and exclude others based on factors correlated with the outcomes of interest, then the highway construction can be treated as exogenous to the areas that the highway runs through.
In this paper, I use an identi…cation strategy similar in spirit to that in Chandra and Thompson (2000) to address the endogeneity issue. I argue that India's Golden Quadrilateral Program, which seeks to improve the quality and width of existing highways connecting the four largest cities in India (Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai) , a¤ected the quality of highway transportation available to …rms in cities that happened to lie along the routes of the four National Highways it upgraded, while leaving the quality of highways available to …rms in cities that lay along other national highways una¤ected.
This allows for a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation strategy, where changes in relevant outcomes for a¤ected …rms are compared to the corresponding outcomes for …rms whose location precluded their directly bene…ting from the highway program.
The structure and content of the data used here, which are from two rounds of the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys for India, are particularly well-suited for tackling the questions discussed above. The panel structure of the data allows me to compare the changes in the responses of a representative sample of 1,091 …rms in 37 cities -of which The surveys also provide direct evidence about …rms'perceptions of the degree to which transportation constitutes an obstacle to their productive activities. While these data are di¢ cult to interpret in a cross-sectional setting, I utilize the panel structure of the data to see how …rm's responses to this question re ‡ected the change in road quality due to the Golden Quadrilateral project.
The key …ndings of the paper are as follows. First, I …nd that …rms in cities a¤ected by the highway project became 7.6 percentage points, or about 60 per cent, less likely to report that transportation constituted a 'major'or 'severe'obstacle to production, while there was no signi…cant change in the responses of …rms in o¤-Golden Quadrilateral cities.
Secondly, the di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimate of the e¤ect of the highway construction on the average stock of input inventories held by a …rm is signi…cantly negative and large in magnitude. Firms on the Golden Quadrilateral highways reduced their average input inventory (measured in terms of the number of days of production the inventory was su¢ cient for) by 7 days more than corresponding …rms which lay on other highways.
Thus, inventory management became sigini…cantly leaner for treatment …rms relative to control …rms after the improved highways were put into place. Finally, I …nd that …rms in cities that gained better highway access were much more likely to have switched the supplier who provided them with their primary input than …rms in cities where road quality did not improve. These latter two e¤ects can, I argue, be interpreted as showing that …rms that gain access to higher-quality highways are able to produce more e¢ ciently (as captured by their inventory management becoming leaner) than in the absence of the improved highways, and to exploit opportunities that may earlier have been unfeasible, which we argue are unambiguously economically bene…cial to these …rms. I …nd that the results are robust to the exclusion of …rms in the 4 nodal metropolitan cities (Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai), whose status as 'on-Golden Quadrilateral'cities was a matter of design rather than fortuitousness. Viewed together, these results support the idea that the highway construction project eased the extent to, and channels through, which transportation infrastructure constrains …rms.
However, I also …nd that although there was no initial di¤erence in the fraction of …rms who report that transportation was a major obstacle between on-and o¤-Golden Quadrilateral cities, the same is not true of inventory holdings: …rms in Golden Quadrilateral cities held signi…cantly higher input inventories before the highway project than …rms in o¤-Golden Quadrilateral cities. While not directly contradicting the identifying assumption of common trends, this does suggest that the argument made for using nonGolden Quadrilateral cities as controls for cities directly a¤ected by the project may be problematic: perhaps the highways that were included in the highway project were at that point the most congested or overburdened. I attempt to understand why inventory behavior was so di¤erent among …rms in Golden Quadrilateral cities compared to unaffected …rms by including controls for industrial composition and also by revisiting the perceptions data, but the results are somewhat contradictory. If anything, fewer …rms in Golden Quadrilateral cities said that transportation was no obstacle or a minor obstacle than …rms in non-Golden Quadrilateral cities before the highways were in place, which does not square well with their reported inventory holdings.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the speci…c context of this paper, the Indian highway network and the Golden Quadrilateral project. Section 3 explains the identi…cation strategy used in the paper, which relies on using the Golden Quadrilateral Project as a shock to the quality of highway infrastructure to cities it passed through versus those it bypassed that is unrelated to (…rms in) the cities'(potential) economic performance. Section 4 motivates the focus on inventory behavior and supplier relationships, and discusses the data and variables used in this paper. Section 5 presents the key results and their interpretation. Section 6 concludes.
Background

The Indian Highway System
India's road network, which carries 65 per cent of the country's freight (World Bank 2007) is dominated by its 66,000 kilometer-long network of 228 federally-built and maintained National Highways, which connect major cities in the country to one another, and which carry 40 per cent of the country's road tra¢ c inspite of comprising only 2 per cent of its aggregate road length of 3.3 millon kilometers. The prominent role played by the National Highway system has motivated policymakers to pay considerable attention to their quality and carrying capacity, which is widely acknowledged to be inadequate to the needs of a rapidly-expanding economy, both in terms of lane capacity (the bulk of the National Highway network as of the year 2000 was of two lanes or less; 32 per cent was in fact single-laned; and virtually none of the network was of 4 or more lanes) and surface quality. In addition, even national highways in India are not access-controlled, so that highways often pass through busy towns and villages, with adverse consequences not only for tra¢ c speed but also safety .
This has led to widespread congestion: the World Bank estimated that 'a quarter of all India's highways are congested, reducing truck and bus speeds to 30-40 kmph'. It is therefore no surprise that policy-makers argue that India's highway network acts as a constraint on highe economic growth: for example, the World Bank country strategy for India 'identi…es highway bottlenecks as one of the major constraints to poverty reduction and private sector-led growth'(World Bank 2005).
The Golden Quadrilateral Project
In December The Golden Quadrilateral marked a distinct shift in India's road-building strategy.
Prior to the approval of the NHDP, India had concentrated its road-building budget on expanding all-weather access rather than improving quality or capacity. Prior to the NHDP, virtually all of the 600,000 km that was added to India's road network in the 1990s consisted of 'very low-standard roads to reach more of the rural areas which had before been outside the reach of all-weather access. High standard arterial highways ... 3 Identi…cation Stragegy
The Golden Quadrilateral Project as a Natural Experiment
As discussed above, the key issue that makes it di¢ cult to estimate the causal e¤ect of infrastructure such as highways is that their placement is non-random, so that places that receive more or better infrastructure are systematically di¤erent from areas that do not.
However, as Chandra and Thompson (2000) have pointed out, the nature of many large highway network projects is such as to allow them to be used as an exogenous shock to areas that they pass through. The argument relies on the fact that when highways are built to connect two places, they pass through areas that lie between those two points.
If the highway route is not determined to speci…cally pass through certain intermediate areas to the exclusion of other possible places it could have been routed through, then it may be argued that intermediate areas get better infrastructure not as a consequence of economic or other characteristics, but merely because of where they are located.
The argument for using the Golden Quadrilateral project in a natural experiment framework is similar to that in Chandra and Thompson (2000) , who use the US Interstate Highway construction program as an exogenous shock to the connectedness of districts through which the highways built passed relative to those they bypassed. The Government's decision to pick the existing highways connecting the country's four largest cities as the ones that were to be widened and improved as part of the project meant di¤erent things for smaller cities in the country depending on which national highway a particular city lay on. All major cities in India lie on the route of at least one National Highway, so whether or not a city saw a sharp improvement in the quality of its highway links depended on which pre-existing National Highway passed through or near it. Cities were not included or excluded from bene…ting from the highway improvements under the Golden Quadrilateral based on their existing or potential economic growth, as we might imagine would be the case if the route of the highways was not pre-determined. The highways included in the Golden Quadrilateral provided the most direct links between the country's four largest cities, and the highway routes were not realigned to exclude some cities and include others.
Thus, cities could not opt in or out of getting improved highway access, thus precluding a situation where the highway was routed through areas that 'needed it most'(for example, areas which were growing more rapidly than others, or which had particularly pressing infrastructure issues). A city that lay between Delhi and Calcutta but was not on NH2
(such as Lucknow, a city in the state of Uttar Pradesh) would not directly bene…t from improved connectivity from the Golden Quadrilateral, but a city that did lie on NH2 (such as Kanpur, a similar-sized city in the state of Uttar Pradesh) would. This motivates the empirical strategy used in this paper, where the changes in outcomes of …rms that lay in cities that lay along the upgraded highways ('treated' cities) are compared to the corresponding changes in outcomes for …rms in cities that did not lie along the route of the Golden Quadrilateral highways ('control cities') in order to measure the e¤ect of highway quality. Put di¤erently, our estimate of the e¤ect of the Golden Quadrilateral uses the changes in outcome variables for …rms on non-Golden Quadrilateral highways as estimates of the counterfactual for treated …rms.
A caveat is, however, in order. The validity of the identi…cation strategy relies on the assumption that the …rms on the Golden Quadrilateral highways and other …rms in the sample have common trends in inventory and supplier behavior, which is what makes the change over time in the outcomes for the latter sets of …rms a good control for the former set. It is not possible, given that there is only one pre-treatment period, to test this common trends assumption; however, I will explicitly control for pre-existing di¤erences between …rms in treatment and control cities in the regressions whose results are presented here. As will be discussed in Section 5.4, a potential confound comes from the fact that while cities could not self-select onto the routes of the highways that were upgraded, the choice of which highways to upgrade may have been related to their existing condition, congestion conditions, tra¢ c requirements, etc. In that sense, it is possible that our di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates of the impact of the Golden Quadrilateral Project are upward biased, because road conditions along what eventually became the Golden Quadrilateral were initially worse than road conditions for non-Golden Quadrilateral cities.
Data and Outcome Variables of Interest
Data Sources and Contents
The outcome data used in this paper are from two rounds of the World Bank Enterprise If infrastructure constrains …rms'choices, we should …nd evidence that removing an infrastructural constraint leads to behavior that is unambiguously 'better' for …rms than the choices they were making before the constraint was relaxed. Here, I focus on aspects of …rms'inventory and supplier behavior, which I argue below are plausibly constrained by inadequate highway infrastructure, and which would therefore reasonably be expected to respond to the relaxation of the transport constraint; these are also aspects of …rm behavior that the data allow me to examine. I also examine responses to a question in the surveys that asked …rms to rate how much of an obstacle transportation constituted for them as an added source of information, albeit perceptions-based, on how …rms'perceptions of the adequacy of the available tranportation infrastructure responded to the better highways.
Inventories
The intuition behind a focus on input inventories is straightforward. Since …rms hold input inventories in order to ensure a smooth production ‡ow, a …rm's target inventory level is increasing in its expectations of future sales. However, …rms incur costs (capital, storage and depreciation costs, among others) from holding inventories, also increasing in the amount of inventory held. The balance between these considerations a¤ect the …rm's reorder point, the minimum sustainable level of inventory.
As Shirley and Winston (2001) point out, faster and more reliable highway transportation means that input orders will be received more quickly and with less uncertainty. This means that, conditional on its expectations about production and sales, the …rm will need to keep lower input inventories at any given point in time. 
Supplier Relationships
Another plausible way in which improved roads could impact …rms'input use behavior is by increasing the feasible set of suppliers from whom they could purchase the inputs needed for production. A supplier who was earlier not a feasible choice due to a combination of distance and poor road quality could become feasible given better roads. However, there would be no such expansion in the choice set of …rms who were una¤ected by improvements in road quality. If it were the case that road quality was constraining …rms from making their optimal supplier choices, then …rms in cities impacted by the highwayupgrading program should be more likely to re-optimize their choice of input supplier than …rms in control cities, whose choice set is una¤ected. On the other hand, any supplier who was 'feasible'before the highway upgrade continues to be feasible after the highway project, so that if a …rm does not change its supplier, this implies that the pre-existing choice continues to dominate its expanded choice set, so that road quality was not a binding constraint.
Firms were asked about the length of time they had been in business with their main input supplier, so that evidence of di¤erential changes in supplier turnover come from di¤erential changes in the length of the supplier relationship. Consider how the change in the length of the relationship reported in the two surveys would relate to supplier turnover. The greater the propensity of …rms in any sample of …rms to change suppliers, the lower would be the mean increase in the length of the supplier relationship between the two time periods. Thus, the magnitude of the increase in the supplier relationship length allows us to make inferences about the probability of supplier change between the two periods. Extending this idea to two comparable groups of …rms, therefore, we would …nd that if more …rms in Group A had changed suppliers than in Group B, then the mean di¤erence in the length of the relationship between the survey years would be smaller in Group A than in Group B. The di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimate of the e¤ect of the Golden Quadrilateral project on supplier relationship length then allows us to isolate the e¤ect of the project on supplier turnover, with a negative coe¢ cient implying that …rms in the treatment group increased their supplier relationship length by less than …rms in the control group, implying that treated …rms were more likely to have acquired a new supplier in the period between the surveys than control …rms.
Perceptions of Transportation as an Obstacle to Production
Finally, the data also provide us with information about surveyed …rms'perceptions about how severe an obstacle transportation constituted for them. Firms were asked to choose whether transport constituted no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a moderate obstacle, a major obstacle, or a very severe obtacle to production. In the results presented here, I reclassify this …ve-point scale into three categories of how severe an obstacle transportation constituted to the …rm in question: low (incorporating no obstacle or a minor obstacle, the bottom two categories); medium (which corresponds to the 'moderate obstacle'answer), and high (which incorporates the highest two degrees in the data, major and very severe obstacle). There are well known problems with perceptions data, which make it di¢ cult to compare the responses of di¤erent …rms to each other, but this is obviated to some degree by being able to look at changes in the same set of …rms'perceptions over time, which is what the panel structure of the data allows me to do. This is the approach adopted here in order to provide a set of results which supplement those from the data on inventory stocks and supplier turnover.
Results
Table 1 presents the industrial composition of …rms in the sample, broken up by the status (on or o¤ the Golden Quadrilateral) of the city the …rms were located in. The distribution of …rms across industries in treatment and control …rms is similar: of the 8 top industries in the sample for treatment cities, 7 are also the among the top 8 in control cities. Nonetheless, there are di¤erences: auto components and drugs/pharmaceuticals are a greater proportion of …rms in treatment cities, while electronics …rms make up a larger share of the control sample. In some of the regression results that follow, therefore, I will control for industrial composition. Table 3 presents results from regressions with …rms'inventory holdings as the dependent variable. The coe¢ cient of interest is that on the post-treatment dummy (i.e. the interaction term between the post-period and being in an on-project city), which is the di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimate of the impact of the Golden Quadrilateral. The …rst column presents results from the baseline speci…cation with no additional controls. The estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction of the post-period dummy with the treatment dummy is signi…cantly negative, implying that treatment …rms saw a reduction in their reported inventory holdings of approximately 7.5 days worth of production over and above that seen in the case of control …rms.
Input Inventories: Leaner Inventory Management
A possible complication is that the distribution of …rms across industries may have di¤ered between treatment and control cities. If some industries then saw improvements in inventory management technology or a reduction in input inventory requirements that were unrelated to transportation infrastructure, and if these industries were disproportionately represented in cities on the Golden Quadrilateral, then the interpretation above could be misleading. To check for this, Column II of Table 3 reports results from a speci…cation with industry …xed e¤ects, which does not change the results: the coe¢ cient of interest is -7.4, and is signi…cantly negative. Finally, Column III reports results from a speci…cation with …rm …xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient of interest continues to be signi…cantly negative, and its magnitude is only slightly smaller, at -6.
Di¤erential Supplier Turnover: Evidence on the Length of Supplier Relationships
As Table 4 shows, …rms in cities on the Golden Quadrilateral showed a signi…cantly lower increase in the length of their relationship with their main input supplier, with the point estimate of the coe¢ cient of interest varying between -0.21 and -0.24 in alternative speci…cations. As I argued in Section 4.2.3 above, if supplier turnover were similar across the two groups of …rms, then the interaction of the post-period with the treatment dummy should not pick up a signi…cant coe¢ cient. The coe¢ cient on this variable thus suggests that supplier turnover was greater for …rms on the Golden Quadrilateral than for other …rms in the sample: …rms in cities on the Golden Quadrilateral increased the length of their relationship with their main input supplier by around 4 months less than did corresponding …rms in non-Golden Quadrilateral cities, thus implying that more …rms in Golden Quadrilateral cities switched suppliers between the survey years than did …rms in control cities.
Transportation as an Obstacle to Production
The fraction of …rms who said that transport constituted a 'major'or a very severe obstacle'to production, i.e. those that picked either the highest or second-highest ordinal Table 5 presents the results of di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimates: the results con…rm the results from the regressions using inventories as the dependent variable, with the coe¢ cient of interest (that on the variable post-treatment) being signi…cantly negative. As Columns II and III of Table 5 show, these results are robust to the inclusion of industry and …rm …xed e¤ects. The perceptions data thus back up the results from the …gures on input inventory management and the length of the supplier relationship presented in the preceding sub-sections.
All these results are as expected in that the Golden Quadrilateral eased transportation constraints di¤erentially for a¤ected …rms relative to other …rms. But were these constraints equally severe for both sets of …rms to begin with, as one would expect if assignment was, as argued, unrelated to the conditions of the cities in either subset? Here, the perceptions data and the inventories data no longer tell the same story.
Pre-Existing Di¤erences between Cities On and O¤ the Golden Quadrilateral
The coe¢ cients on the variable 'treatment', which is a dummy which takes the value 1 for cities on the Golden Quadrilateral and 0 otherwise, is signi…cantly positive (see Table 3 ),
suggesting that there were signi…cant pre-existing di¤erences in inventory holding patterns between …rms in treatment and control cities. A comparison across the rows of Column I of Table 2 con…rms that non-Golden Quadrilateral cities held many more days of inventory in 13 characteristics/needs for inventories, or both, were systematically di¤erent between the two kinds of cities prior to the project being initiated. In the absence of more pre-Golden Quadrilateral data, it is not possible to explicitly test the 'common trends'assumption underlying the di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimation strategy, which may still be valid, but the …nding reported above is potentially problematic for the simple exogenous change in road quality story stressed here, as it implies that while it may be the case that individual cities did not have the option to opt in or out of the project, there may be some reason that the 4 highways included in the project were included: perhaps these were the most congested and overburdened highways in the country. This is potentially problematic for the interpretation of the magnitude of the di¤erences-in-di¤erences results presented thus far, since it suggests that using the change in the inventory holdings of …rms in non-Golden
Quadrilateral cities may not be a good control for the counterfactual change in inventory holdings in Golden Quadrilateral cities.
Is it then the case that while treatment cities saw an improvement in their transport If anything, as Table 6 shows, the fraction of …rms in treatment cities who say that transportation poses no obstacle is larger, at 0.47, than the corresponding fraction (0.40) in control cities. This does not suggest that …rms in treatment cities were signi…cantly more disadvantaged when it came to transportation than …rms in control cities; if anything, quite the opposite. However, it is worth keeping in mind that this relies on comparing perceptions data across di¤erent …rms, an undertaking that is problematic to the extent that two …rms may perceive the same quality of infrastructure very di¤erently: indeed, it appears here that …rms in cities which would later bene…t from better highways rated the quality of their transportation infrastructure very similarly to other …rms although they also seem to have been holding far many more days'production worth of input inventories, which suggests that perceptions may be quite clearly conditioned by what is expected or appears to be the norm. The fact remains, however, that cities on and o¤ the upgraded highways reported holding very di¤erent amounts of inventories prior to the project, so that the magnitude of estimates of the project's impact should be interpreted with some caution; this is something that data limitations preclude a deeper investigation of at this point.
Robustness Check: Excluding Nodal Metropolitan Cities
The results presented so far have all used data for all cities in the sample. Four of these cities -Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata -are the metropolitan cities which form the nodes of the improved highway system, and which the highways that were upgraded were chosen to connect. One obvious worry therefore is that these cities did not receive upgraded highways by virtue of lying on highways that were chosen to be upgraded:
that argument works, strictly speaking, only for other cities that lay on the upgraded highways. I therefore test for the robustness of my results to the exclusion of these metropolitan cities by running the regressions again with these cities excluded from the sample. The results of the regressions on this non-metropolitan sample are presented in Table 7 for the three key outcome variables used here -days of inventory held, supplier history, and the probability that the …rm rated transport as a 'major' or 'very severe' obstacle to production. Reassuringly, the exclusion of the nodal metropolitan cities has no e¤ect on either the signi…cance, direction, and in particular the magnitudes, of the estimated e¤ects of the highway program. propensity to change suppliers between the two years, suggesting that they found more suitable suppliers at a greater rate than …rms in cities una¤ected by the highway project.
Seen together, these pieces of evidence substantiate the idea that improved highways facilitated productive choices which …rms may have wanted to make even earlier, but were constrained from being able to make by the quality of highways available to them.
There is a large literature (see for example Djankov et al. 2008 , Knittel 2002 ) that explores the e¤ect of policy variables, such as regulatory practices and taxation, on …rms' productive choices and through these on …rm e¢ ciency. This paper contributes to this literature by arguing that infrastructure quality is another key factor that a¤ects how e¢ ciently …rms are able to produce, and by identifying the channels through which the e¤ects of improved roads are channeled. In the speci…c context of India, the …ndings of this paper, seen in conjunction with the …ndings of papers such as Chari (2007) contribute to an understanding of what the government should (not) try to do if the private sector in that country is to ful…l its potential as a driver of economic growth. 
